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1. INTRODUCTION
The advent of new technologies such as cloud computing and social network sites has enabled
new types of collaborative systems. Traditional collaborative systems (e.g., workflow management
systems) focus on task sharing among multiple users [Tolone et al. 2005]. In contrast, modern
collaborative systems enable both users and organizations to build communities to promote common
interests, and share content with each other. Therefore, collaborative systems have evolved from
being task-centered – wherein users gather together in “groups” to perform a common “task” –
to community-centered, wherein “communities” of online users share information and resources of
common interests.
Community-centered systems have a number of unique characteristics, in addition to the ones
of task-centered collaborative systems. First, they are complex and dynamic systems, where inter-
personal relations regulate the interplay among users. Users build a community by establishing
online relationships that resemble their real-life interpersonal relationships. Moreover, community-
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centered systems are multi-party systems. Based on established interpersonal relationships, users
cooperate to create, manage and protect resources within the community. Last but not least, com-
munities can bring together users with different background and expertise. Similar to traditional
information systems and task-centered collaborative systems, the interplay of lay users calls for
easy-to-use and transparent way for managing shared resources. However, this demand becomes
even more crucial within community-centered systems, compared to other types of information sys-
tems, due to their complex and multi-party nature.
As community-centered collaborative systems have emerged and gained increasing popularity,
the need of proper mechanisms for protecting sensitive resources shared in these systems is be-
coming a primary concern. Unfortunately, traditional access control models are not well suited
for community-centered systems, as they are either too rigid (e.g., Mandatory Access Control),
too structured (e.g., Role-Based Access Control), or not sufficiently powerful (e.g., Discretionary
Access Control) to support the dynamic sharing and access control needs of communities. As a
consequence, several research efforts have focused on the design of novel models and mechanisms
able to provide fine-grained control over the access and usage of sensitive resources shared in these
environments. In particular, much attention has been placed on access control issues in the social
computing domain, wherein a large amount of personal content is often shared among users (e.g.,
[Fong 2011; Ahn et al. 2012; Carminati et al. 2009; Damen and Zannone 2013; Hu et al. 2013;
Squicciarini et al. 2010; Xiao and Tan 2012; Rajtmajer et al. 2016; Vishwamitra et al. 2017]).
In this survey, we present a thorough analysis of the current state-of-the-art in access control
for community-centered collaborative systems. First, we have identified relevant characteristics of
community-centered collaborative systems based on a study of the literature, on the analysis of real-
world scenarios wherein collaboration demands proper access control support and on the current
state of affair of community-centered systems. Driven by these characteristics, we have identified
a set of non-functional requirements that access control models and mechanisms for these systems
should meet. For each requirement, we have then identified the features that access control systems
should support to satisfy the requirement.
Requirements and related features used as a baseline for our analysis of the literature encompass
various aspects of an access control system, and range from policy specification and governance to
usability, transparency and evaluation. Some requirements are used to assess the ability of existing
access control models to capture and reason on the users’ interplay and dynamics of communi-
ties, e.g. interpersonal relationships and context, for access decision making. We have marked these
requirements as related to ‘policy specification’. Governance requirements aim to study the manage-
ment of shared resources among multiple stakeholders, e.g. multiple ownership, policy combination
and conflict resolution. Usability requirements are used to assess how simple an access control sys-
tem is from the end user point of view in terms of its usage. Transparency requirements focus on the
support provided to users for understanding the consequences of enforcing access control policies
on shared resources. In addition to those requirements, we also investigate the type of evaluation
used to assess the effectiveness of an access control system. This last feature aims to provide an
indication of the level of maturity of existing access control systems.
We review the relevant literature according to these requirements, and provide an overview of
many recent access control models and mechanisms for community-centered systems. In particular,
we analyze existing proposals with respect to the identified features and, for each feature, we iden-
tify the main research trends that have emerged in the last decade. Finally, we assess to what extent
existing access control models and mechanisms satisfy the elicited requirements.
Our analysis leads to several important insights. First, it unveils a growing interest in this sub-field
of access control, and highlights some of the most important contributions and accomplishments in
the last decades. Further, it identifies gaps in the literature and provides pointers for future research
in this space. In particular, we noticed that existing works only deal with one of the characteristics of
community-centered systems at the time, namely either relationship-based access control or multi-
party data governance. Another major gap is the lack of concrete mechanism deployments and of
their evaluation.













































































Table I: Comparison of our Survey to Other Related Survey Articles
1.1. Related Work
Access control for collaborative systems has been the subject of a large body of research work.
Much of this literature is summarized in a number of literature reviews [Asim and Malik 2016;
Carminati and Ferrari 2008; Ferrari 2010; Samarati and De Capitani di Vimercati 2000; Suhendra
2011; Tolone et al. 2005], which we briefly discuss here. Tolone et al. [2005] discuss the merits
and shortcomings of early access control models like Access Matrix [Lampson 1974], Role-Based
Access Control [Sandhu et al. 1996], Task-Based Access Control [Thomas and Sandhu 1997] and
Team-Based Access Control [Thomas 1997] when applied to collaborative systems. Carminati and
Ferrari [2008] analyze the main research proposals on security and privacy for social networks
with particular emphasis on access control. The authors list a set of requirements for access con-
trol models and systems with respect to policy specification and enforcement. Accordingly, they
review existing proposals (up to the year 2008) on access control for social network sites in light
of these requirements. Similarly, Carminati and Ferrari [2010] identify the requirements for the
specification of access control policies tailored to online social networks (i.e., relationship-based)
and for their privacy-preserving enforcement (i.e., not centralized, efficiency). Based on these re-
quirements, the authors review the relationships-based access control models proposed at that time
and cryptographic techniques for preventing the disclosure of sensitive information concerning in-
terpersonal relationships during policy enforcement. Kayes and Iamnitchi [2015] discuss security
and privacy issues in social networks. Authors focus on privacy and security risks in online social
networks, and briefly discuss access control models as solutions to protect users from attacks from
other social network users. More recently, Asim and Malik [2016] reviewed access control mod-
els in the context of social networks by categorizing them in relationship-based, attribute-based,
community-structure-based and user activity centric models.
Table I provides a comparative analysis of our work with the literature reviews mentioned above.
The comparison is based on the type of collaborative systems considered as well as on the access
control aspects considered in this survey, namely policy specification, policy governance, usability,
transparency and evaluation. Compared to our survey, Tolone et al. [2005] review only access
control models for traditional task-centered collaborative systems rather than community-centric
collaborative ones. In contrast, Carminati and Ferrari [2008], Carminati and Ferrari [2010], Kayes
and Iamnitchi [2015], Asim and Malik [2016] focus on community-centered collaborative systems,
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but only review some of the aspects related to access control that are relevant for this type of
systems. They mainly address issues related to the specification of policies, and do not consider
other issues related to collaboration such as collaborative authoring and administration of policies
as well as the usability, transparency and evaluation of existing solutions. In contrast, our survey
provides a much more comprehensive overview of existing research efforts on access control for
community-centered collaborative systems.
1.2. Organization
The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides an overview of the research challenges
in designing community-centric collaborative systems and delineates the main requirements that
access control models for those systems should meet. Section 3 reviews existing literature on policy
specification and, in particular, analyzes existing access control models in the context of collab-
oration and communities. Section 4 reviews recent developments in the area of administration of
shared resources within community-centered systems. Section 5 reviews approaches aiming to en-
hance the usability and transparency of access control systems. Section 6 discusses the evaluation
methods currently used to evaluate access control systems for community-centered systems. Sec-
tion 7 identifies open issues and draws a roadmap for future research. Finally, Section 8 concludes
the paper.
2. SECURITY CHALLENGES IN COMMUNITY-CENTERED COLLABORATIVE SYSTEMS
This section provides an overview of the research challenges in community-centered collaborative
systems and identifies the main requirements for the design of access control solutions tailored to
such systems.
2.1. Community-Centered Collaborative Systems
Collaboration is becoming a fundamental part of modern information systems. The term “collabo-
rative system” in this paper is used to refer to systems that bring geographically distributed users
together, supporting communication, coordination and cooperation [Bafoutsou and Mentzas 2002].
Examples of collaborative systems range from virtual organizations, supply chains and international
military coalitions [den Hartog and Zannone 2016; Trivellato et al. 2013] to remote collaborative
editing and programming environments [Shen and Dewan 1992] and collaborative design [Kim
et al. 2006]. These collaborative systems are task-centered in the sense that a group of users or
organizations cooperate to accomplish a common task.
In this survey, we focus our analysis on an increasingly popular type of collaborative systems,
namely “community-centered” (collaborative) systems. A community is “a persistent, sustained
[social-technical] network of individuals who share and develop an overlapping knowledge base,
set of beliefs, values, history, and experiences” [Barab et al. 2004]. Community-centered systems
aim to support the interplay among the members of a community by providing them with platforms
and tools that promote and facilitate the sharing of information and resources of interest.
Community-centered systems have specific characteristics that are more prominent compared to
other types of collaborative systems. First, interpersonal relationships among users plays a key role
in the dynamics of community-centered systems [Gates 2007; Carminati et al. 2009; Carminati and
Ferrari 2010; Fong 2011], wherein relationships mirror offline social connections (e.g., friends, col-
leagues) among users. These relationships are typically ad-hoc and can evolve over time; moreover,
they are typically not governed by a central administrative unit or a business agreement. In particu-
lar, communities are characterized by the longevity of interpersonal relationships and collaboration
among their members in contrast to the task-oriented nature of other types of collaboration, e.g. vir-
tual organizations and supply chains, which typically dissolves once the task is completed [Barab
et al. 2004].
Another key characteristic of community-centered systems is given by their multi-party nature. In
community-centered systems, multiple members can contribute to the creation and management of
resources, being data or any other object [Damen and Zannone 2013; Hu et al. 2013]. The collabora-
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tive management of shared resources has a significant impact on their protection. In fact, it has been
largely recognized that individuals can have different privacy concerns and privacy attitudes [Koko-
lakis 2017], which can result in the specification of possibly conflicting protection requirements for
shared resources.
Last but not least, communities can bring together people with different technical background
and expertise. Psychological acceptability of protection mechanisms has been largely recognized
as a main challenge in the security research community since the seminal work of Saltzer and
Schroeder [1975]. For instance, policy specification has been recognized as a difficult and costly
task for end-users [Fang and LeFevre 2010; Klemperer et al. 2012; Squicciarini et al. 2017]. This is
even more challenging in community-centered systems mainly due to the multi-party nature of these
systems, wherein the members of the community should collaboratively specify protection require-
ments for shared resources. In addition, users can find challenges in understanding the effects of the
specified policies (e.g., in terms of authorized users). This is because of the (possibly conflicting)
protection requirements provided by multiple stakeholders [Hu et al. 2013; Mahmudlu et al. 2016]
and because of the continued evolution of interpersonal relationships between users [Carminati and
Ferrari 2010; Fong 2011; Fong et al. 2013]. This issue is further aggravated by the functionality
for information sharing and community building provided by many existing community-centered
systems (e.g., tagging). While promoting information sharing, these functionalities can lead to
a disclosure of information that is unforeseeable and unexpected by users [Damen and Zannone
2013; McLaughlin and Vitak 2012], who can sense it as a lack of control over their information.
The most popular and largely studied form of community-centered systems is represented by so-
cial network websites. Social network websites provide an environment that allows ease of connect-
ing people to one another and share information based on common interests. We note however, that,
in addition to social networks, many other applications are emerging in the context of community-
centered collaborative systems. A concrete example of non-social networking application is the
emerging practice in healthcare of sharing sensitive health-revealing information in bio repositories
for the purpose of genetic personalized medicine. Bio repositories collect sensitive data that reveal
health-related information not only about patients but also about their families [Egea et al. 2013].
Conflicts may arise among the policies generated from patients’ and other family members. For
example, a patient may want to take a genetic test to verify his chances of having a cardiac arrest,
which has affected most of the members of his family, and he wants to make the results available to
his insurance company. However, other members of his family might be against that because they
are afraid that the cost of their health insurance will increase if test results are disclosed. In this
setting, it is desirable to capture the interpersonal relationships among the members of the commu-
nity (the patient and his family in the example) as well as to support ways to reconcile possibly
inconsistent or conflicting access control requirements.
Currently, however, most (if not all) real-world systems mandate that access decisions are man-
ually entered by a single user. This approach does not support ways for patients to transparently
control how their data will be accessed by others. Even more difficult is the question of how to
relieve lay users (e.g., the patient and the members of his family) from the burden of managing the
disclosure of the genetic test results. They should be able to easily express consent and exercise
control over the data. Even though it is critical for patients and their families to gain better control
over their genetic data, there is currently no mechanism to support these complex processes in an
automated fashion. Therefore, given the highly sensitive nature of this data, it is important to sup-
port a fine-grained specification of access rights and their human-mediated enforcement. In case of
inconsistencies, rather than applying blanket policies, access control mechanisms should support
easy-to-use semi-automated conflict resolution methods and enable transparent data management in
a coherent fashion.
Similarly, beyond this example, even social computing sites and other modern collaborative sys-
tems only support minimal features for truly collaborative access control. Most of the real-world
existing access control solutions manage resources and data through simple owner-specified poli-
cies, which may later be reviewed and edited by co-managers or other stakeholders, leaving room
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Access control models should be able to manage the increased complexity that collabo-
ration and communities introduce.
R2 Policy
Specification
Access control models should be able to capture the dynamics and context of collabora-
tion and communities.
R3 Governance Access control models should allow the collaborative administration of shared resources.
R4 Governance Access control models should support conflict resolution methods.
R5 Usability Access control systems should be unobtrusive and should not impose extra overhead on
users.
R6 Usability Access control systems should support users in the inspection and configuration of their
access preferences.
R7 Transparency Access control systems should be transparent to users and should allow users to under-
stand collaborative decisions and their effect.
Table II: Requirements for access control models and systems tailored to community-centered
systems
for user errors, security issues, inconsistencies and other security and functional concerns. For in-
stance, in many social network websites like Facebook the user hosting the information in their
profile, has full control of the information regardless of the privacy preferences given by the user
who posted the information or the user(s) to whom the information refers [Hu et al. 2011]. Besides
that, existing social network websites offer other capabilities to promote information sharing and
community building, possibly introducing additional complications and undesired effects on the
protection of users’ privacy. A typical example of such capabilities is the tagging feature provided
by Facebook. It has been shown that tagging could increase the visibility of tagged objects beyond
users’ expectations [Damen and Zannone 2013; Pesce et al. 2012; Wisniewski et al. 2015]. In or-
der to deal with these concerns new solutions that allow the understanding of the consequences of
enforcing (possible conflicting) protection requirements on shared resources are needed.
In the last years, several research efforts have been devoted to the study and design of access
control models and mechanisms able to deal with the characteristics and challenges specific to
community-centered systems (e.g., [Fong 2011; Ahn et al. 2012; Carminati et al. 2009; Damen et al.
2014; Hu et al. 2013; Squicciarini et al. 2010; Xiao and Tan 2012; Rajtmajer et al. 2016]). In the
next section, we elicit the requirements that access control systems for community-centered systems
should meet based on the key characteristics of these systems discussed above. Then, we review
the relevant literature and identify prominent trends in the area of access control for community-
centered systems with respect to the elicited requirements.
2.2. Requirements
In order to support access control in community-centered systems, in addition to classic security
and usability requirements considered in many access control systems (e.g., correctness, safety,
reachability, feasibility etc. [Crampton and Sellwood 2014; Fong 2011; Stoller et al. 2011]), ad
hoc non-functional requirements must be met. We derive a list of such requirements based on the
key characteristics of community-centered systems that we have discussed in the previous section
(see Table II). The identified requirements can be organized in three main classes. The first class
includes requirements related to policy specification in the context of community and its dynamic
nature. The second class of requirements is related to the governance of shared resources. Finally,
the last class of requirements promotes the usability of access control systems and the transparency
of access decision making for the members of community-centered systems (who are usually lay
users). We discuss each class of requirements separately and link them with the specific character-
istics of community-centered collaborative systems.
Requirements for Policy Specification. Access control models should be able to handle the com-
plexity and dynamics of community-centered systems (R1 and R2). To this end, an access con-
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trol model should provide elements that facilitate the specification of access control policies in
the context of community-centered systems (i.e., support for interpersonal relationships and related
constraints, context). As shown in the bio data example of Section 2.1, high-level specification of
access rights would simplify patients’ understanding and doctors’ data practices. Lay users should
be able to specify whom they want their data (e.g., health record, blood work, etc.) to be shared
with, without entering into complex notions of access roles or security requirements. For instance,
interpersonal relationships (e.g., family members) can prove intuitive and effective to use in order
to capture complex connections among users in a given domain. In fact, as first noted by Carmi-
nati et al. [2006], and later discussed by Gates [2007] and Carminati et al. [2009], one effective
way to improve policy specification is to constrain access rights with respect to the interpersonal
relationships or level of trust between the resource owner and resource requester. As subsequently
suggested by other researchers, these relationships can also capture more complex scenarios, i.e.
multi-party access control, when a binary relationship between the resource owner and requester is
not sufficient [Squicciarini et al. 2010; Hu et al. 2011]. In our bio data example, this requirement
translates to supporting access control policies against the different interpersonal relationships be-
tween the patient and his family and the – possibly complex – dynamics of communities. We will
discuss proposals aiming to achieve those requirements in Section 3.
Requirements for Governance. Multi-party systems like community-centered systems require
mechanisms for the collaborative administration of shared resources (R3). Of particular interest
is the ability to reconcile or solve possible conflicts due to multiple administrators managing the
same resource (R4). It is worth noting that generic policy conflicts are a long-standing issue in ac-
cess control (e.g., [Bertino et al. 2003; McDaniel and Prakash 2006]), particularly in the context of
database systems and for XACML policies. Yet, in the context of community-centered systems, this
issue arises due to the presence of multiple stakeholders at play, and their potentially conflicting se-
curity goals on a same resource, and the lack of a central security authority or administrator. These
conflicts may be solved using predefined conflict resolution strategies [Jajodia et al. 2001; Li et al.
2009; Shen and Dewan 1992] or automated conflict resolution solutions that strive for mutual agree-
ment [Squicciarini et al. 2014; Such and Criado 2016; Xiao and Tan 2012]. Solutions addressing
those requirements are reviewed in Section 4.
Requirements for Usability and Transparency. The need of ease-of-use access control systems is
not new and has been largely recognized since the seminal work of Saltzer and Schroeder [1975]
as a main design principle for psychological acceptability of protection mechanisms. Usability of
access control systems is even more critical and challenging to achieve in community-centered sys-
tems. The complex nature of community-centered environments, where resources can be managed
by several users, can make the specification and configuration of access preferences even more
challenging and error-prone than in generic access control systems. Policy specification should be
assisted by supporting interfaces that can help offset the burden from lay users, and address poten-
tial dependencies and inconsistencies (R5 and R6). Moreover, access control systems usually make
decisions in a blackbox manner [Ghai et al. 2010; Mahmudlu et al. 2016] and do not inform users
about the privacy risks arising from collaborative decisions. In the context of collaboration, where
data can be administrated by several users with possibly conflicting privacy and sharing preferences,
it should be possible for users to understand why a certain decision on their data has been taken and
what the effect of such a decision is (R7). We will discuss solutions aiming to enhance usability of
access control mechanisms and user awareness about access decision making in Section 5.
Last but not least, we have observed a large gap between the solutions proposed by the research
community and the solutions currently employed by commercial community-centered systems like
online social networks. Although this can be due to the lack of financial incentive from the online
collaborative platform providers, it may also be an indication of the limited maturity of this research
field. In particular, the extent to which mechanisms for community-based access control are actually
applicable (and therefore tested) to real-world systems is important, and constitutes an additional,
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ad-hoc requirement. We provide an overview of the methods currently used for the evaluation of
access control solutions for community-centered systems in Section 6.
3. POLICY SPECIFICATION
A main component of access control systems is represented by the policies used to regulate the ac-
cess to data. An access control policy defines high-level rules specifying who can access a protected
object and under which conditions [Samarati and De Capitani di Vimercati 2000]. Ideally, policies
should be able to express conditions based on the needs and characteristics of the target application
domain. In the context of community-centered systems, we have identified two main desiderata for
the specification of access control policies, namely the ability to specify conditions under which ac-
cess is granted based on interpersonal relationships among users (req. R1) and context information
related to collaboration and community (req. R2).
Several access control models have been proposed for the specification of access control policies.
An access control model provides a formal representation of access control policies and their evalu-
ation [Samarati and De Capitani di Vimercati 2000], including the concepts used to represent access
conditions tailored to the application domain. In this section, we review existing access control
models in the context of collaboration and community. In particular, we first present an overview
of access control models that have not been designed specifically for community-centered systems,
and discuss their limitations; then, we review access control models that are used to handle autho-
rization in community-centered environments and, in particular, a novel access control paradigm
called relationship-based access control.
3.1. Overview on Conventional Access Control Models
Many early access control models rely on the notion of access matrix [Lampson 1974]. In an access
matrix A, rows represent users, columns represent objects, and each entry A[s, o] indicates the
access rights that user s has on object o. Access matrix has several limitations, especially when
considering community-centered systems and collaborative environments in general. First of all,
access matrix is an identity-based access control model, in which access rights have to be specified
for each subject and object individually. This makes the specification and management of access
rights impractical for open and complex systems like community-centered systems. Moreover, this
model does not account for context information and, thus, is not able to capture the dynamic nature
of collaboration and community.
To overcome these limitations, several other access control models have been proposed over the
years. Examples of such models are Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) [Sandhu et al. 1996] and
Task-Based Access Control (TBAC) [Thomas and Sandhu 1997]. RBAC introduces the notions of
role and role hierarchy to simplify the specification and management of access control policies
within an organization. Roles are used to model job functions within an organization; specifically,
a role represents the set of permissions needed to carry out a certain job function [Sandhu 1996]. A
role hierarchy defines the inheritance of permissions between roles based on the organization struc-
ture. In RBAC, permissions are not assigned to users directly; instead, permissions are assigned to
roles and users inherit the permissions assigned to the role(s) they have (directly or through role
hierarchy). TBAC proposes to organize and manage user permissions with respects to the tasks to
be executed. Although the aforementioned access control models provide some basic features to fa-
cilitate the specification and management of access control policies for collaborative environments,
they are not able to fully handle the complexity of collaboration and communities. Both RBAC and
TBAC provide very limited support for modeling and reasoning on the context; in these models con-
text information is usually limited to tasks and workflow progress, which is insufficient to capture
the complex nature of collaboration [Tolone et al. 2005]. Moreover, they do not use interpersonal
relationships among users in access decision making.
Other researchers have introduced the notion of team in access control to capture the effect of
group dynamics on the protection of sensitive resources. For instance, TeaM-based Access Control
(TMAC) [Thomas 1997] extends RBAC with the notion of team to group users for access control
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purposes. Teams are structured in terms of roles, thus providing a means for defining the collabora-
tion context for the activities to be executed. However, TMAC does not account for the interpersonal
relationships among team members, limiting its applicability to community-centered environments.
Similarly to TMAC, Bullock and Benford [1999] present an access control mechanism that aims to
support people working together in collaborative teams. The authors investigate the group access
functionality within the SPACE access control model [Bullock and Benford 1997] and, in partic-
ular, define a number of policies that constrain the access rights of a group of users based on the
properties of the team as a whole.
A prolific research stream has explored how to balance the ability to collaborate and the secu-
rity of shared resources across organizational boundaries. This stream has resulted in a number of
coalition-based access control models [Cohen et al. 2002; Phillips et al. 2002; Atluri and Warner
2004; Trivellato et al. 2013] and workflow-based access control models [Kang et al. 2001; Wainer
et al. 2003]. These models usually extend earlier access control models like RBAC, TBAC and
TMAC to address requirements typical of inter-organizational resource sharing. However, these
models as their precursory models do not presume any connection among users; they are based on
well-defined coalitions and organizations, with predefined roles and hierarchies among users. On
the contrary, in community-centered systems, access decisions are often made according to ad-hoc
relationships, which can evolve over time and are not governed by a central administrative unit.
The need of flexible and dynamic access control systems has also led to the emergence of new
access control models like Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC) [Hu et al. 2014b] and Usage
Control (UCON) [Park and Sandhu 2004]. ABAC is a general-purpose access control model in
which permissions are constrained with respect to the attributes of entities (subjects and objects),
operations and the environment. Similarly, UCON expresses authorizations and obligations in terms
of subject and object attributes; moreover, it employs conditions to check the environmental status.
The use of attributes makes policy specification extremely flexible and expressive, and many ear-
lier access control models can be expressed in ABAC and UCON. Among the others, environment
attributes (and conditions in UCON) allow these models to be context-aware, thus making them
suitable for a variety of applications including community-centered systems. Moreover, interper-
sonal relationships can also be encoded as attributes. However, it has been observed in [Crampton
and Sellwood 2014] that it may be difficult to capture and manage the complex dynamics of com-
munities (e.g., chains of interpersonal relationships) in ABAC.
3.2. Access Control Models for Community-centered Systems
Community-centered systems like social networks provide an environment where users can estab-
lish interpersonal relationships and share information with other users. These relationships play an
important role for users to determine to whom their data can be disclosed. For instance, a user may
want to share some information with his/her colleagues and other information with his/her friends
and family. This has prompted several efforts to accommodate the use of interpersonal relationships
between users in access decision making.
Most of the existing real-world and commercial community-centered systems represent interper-
sonal relationships among their users by employing the notion of group. A group is a collection
of users [Sandhu 1996].1 The notion of group has led to the emergence and adoption of Group-
based Access Control (GBAC) models, especially in online social networks. GBAC shares some
ideas of RBAC: permissions are assigned to groups and users inherit all permissions assigned to
the group(s) they belong. Membership to a group can be established differently depending on the
type of community-centered systems. This difference has led to the definition of different types of
GBAC models. For instance, in some community-centered systems, group membership is based on
1Despite the similarity between the concepts of ‘role’ and ‘group’, in this work we make a clear distinction between these
two concepts. In particular, roles are defined in terms of permissions, whereas groups are defined in terms of users. We refer
to [Sandhu 1996] for a discussion on the differences between these two concepts.
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subscription; users can subscribe to a group, for instance, based on common interests.2 An access
control model targeting this type of communities is Group-Centric Secure Information Sharing (g-
SIS) [Krishnan et al. 2011]. g-SIS proposes to bring users and information together into groups
in order to facilitate information sharing and collaboration by allowing group members to access
information belonging to the group.
In other types of community-centered systems like social networks, users should assign their
contacts to groups and specify which of these groups can access to a certain object. Initially, social
networks only allowed users to group their contacts based on a general notion of ‘friendship’. This,
however, is not sufficient to capture the complexity and diversity of interpersonal relationships be-
tween users, thus failing to provide users with fine-grained control over their information. To offer
users more control over their information, online social networks have started providing them with
the ability to manage multiple social groups as well as to define customized groups. Although this
enables a more fine-grained control on the disclosure of information, some studies [Lederer et al.
2004; Jones and O’Neill 2010] have shown that managing groups can be a significant burden for
users, especially when the number of contacts and relationships is large. To alleviate this burden,
researchers have investigated automated approaches to grouping based on network clustering tech-
niques [Jones and O’Neill 2010; Jones and O’Neill 2011; Xu et al. 2007]. Achieving full automation
may however not be possible due to the variability of criteria that different people use to group their
contacts and the context of the collaboration [Olson et al. 2005]. Moreover, the GBAC models
usually employed by existing social networks do not allow users to specify groups arbitrarily, for
instance, based on chains of interpersonal relationships; in these systems, groups are typically used
to denote direct interpersonal relationships among users.
To overcome these limitations, the last years have witnessed the emergence of a new trend aiming
to support users in the specification of fine-grained access control policies for community-centered
systems. As first noted by Carminati et al. [2006], the sole use of direct interpersonal relationships
is not flexible enough in denoting authorized users in community-centered systems. Based on this
observation, Gates [2007] has introduced a novel access control paradigm based on interpersonal re-
lationships, called Relationship-Based Access Control (ReBAC), and several ReBAC models [Ak-
toudianakis et al. 2013; Bruns et al. 2012; Carminati et al. 2009; Crampton and Sellwood 2014;
Fong et al. 2009; Fong 2011; Fong et al. 2013; Squicciarini et al. 2014] have been proposed since
her seminal paper. These models allow the specification of access control policies that employ social
relationships as the key factor in access decision making. In particular, access decisions are made
on the basis of primitive (e.g., friend) and composite (e.g., friend-of-friend) relationships between
the resource requester and the resource owner. It is worth noting that composite relationships re-
semble chains of trust and delegation of authority, which have been largely studied in the area of
trust management [Ahn et al. 2012; Li et al. 2002; Trivellato et al. 2014].
Interpersonal relationships among users are often represented using a social graph. In a social
graph, nodes denote the entities within the system and edges denote the interpersonal relationships
between those entities. Many ReBAC models like the ones proposed by Bruns et al. [2012], Carmi-
nati et al. [2009], Fong [2011] and Crampton and Sellwood [2014], rely on poly-relational social
graphs. In these models, social graphs are extended by associating edges with a label indicating the
type of relationship between two entities (e.g., friend, colleague, family). ReBAC models usually
express access constraints in terms of paths within the social graph. The main difference between
these models lies in the way constraints are represented and the security properties that can be
verified. For instance, Fong [2011] represents access constraints as formulas in modal logic, thus
providing a robust mathematical foundation for relationship-based access control and formal analy-
sis capabilities to assess policy correctness. However, it has been shown in [Fong and Siahaan 2011]
that modal logic is not representationally complete and several relationship-based policies typical
of Facebook-style social networks cannot be expressed in the language proposed by Fong [2011].
2Note that in this type of community-centered systems interpersonal relationships are built upon affiliation to a group.
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Bruns et al. [2012] address this issue by proposing the use of (a fragment of) hybrid logic for the
specification and enforcement of relationship-based policies. Differently from modal logic, hybrid
logic allows binding a node to a principal in the social graph. This makes it possible to express
graded modalities that are necessary for the specification of relationship-based policies such as “ac-
cess is granted to requesters who have at least k friends in common with the owner” [Bruns et al.
2012]. Crampton and Sellwood [2014] propose a generic ReBAC model based on path conditions.
Path conditions, represented as sequences of relationships, are used to map the resource requester to
a (set of) authorization principal(s). Intuitively, authorization principals are the ReBAC counterpart
of roles in RBAC. In this model, the subject and resource specified in the access request are first
used to find the set of applicable principals. These principals are then used to determine whether the
action specified in the request should be authorized or denied based on a given authorization policy.
Although accounting for the (type of) interpersonal relationships with other users provides users
with a powerful control over who can access their resources, a more fine-grained control may be
desirable. In order to increase users’ empowerment in the control of their information, Carminati
et al. [2009] propose to use the depth and strength of relationships. The depth of relationships repre-
sents the length of the shortest path between two nodes in the social graph, and it is used to control
the radius of the social circle to whom access should be granted, along the line of previous work
in the areas of trust management [Li et al. 2003] and security requirements engineering [Giorgini
et al. 2006]. Moreover, Carminati and colleagues annotate interpersonal relationships with a trust
level representing the strength of relationships and specify access control policies in terms of access
conditions. Intuitively, an access condition is a statement specifying the type of relationship that the
resource requester should have with the resource owner possibly along with constraints on the depth
and trust level of the relationship. Similarly to Carminati and colleagues, Hu et al. [2011], Such and
Criado [2016] and Ilia et al. [2017] explicitly model the strength of relationships between the re-
source owner and requester and use this information to resolve multi-party conflicts (see Section 4).
Accounting for interpersonal relationships between users in access decision making has led to
the definition of topology-based policies [Carminati et al. 2009; Fong et al. 2009; Squicciarini et al.
2014]. Intuitively, topology-based policies rely on topological properties of the social graph to de-
termine the access rights of users. A variety of topology-based policies has been proposed by Fong
et al. [2009]: degree of separation, in which access is permitted if the resource requester is within
a social circle of a given radius from the resource owner; known quantity, in which access is per-
mitted if the resource owner and resource requester share at least a given number of friends; clique,
which strengthens the known quantity policy by requiring that the resource owner and resource
requester are in a k-clique (i.e., in a fully connected graph of order k); trusted referral, in which
access is permitted if the requester has a friendship relation with a given number of users in a given
set; and stranger, in which the resource requester is granted access if it has at least a certain social
‘distance’ from the resource owner. Carminati et al. [2009] extend the ‘degree of separation’ policy
by associating a trust level to relationships and requiring that the strength (i.e., the trust level) of the
path between the resource owner and requester is greater that a certain threshold. Squicciarini et al.
[2014] propose to base access decisions on the closeness between the resource owner and requester
in terms of common neighbor where access is allowed if the resource owner and requester share k
common neighbor.
Community-centered systems are usually dynamic, wherein the interpersonal relationships be-
tween users can change and evolve over time. The dynamics of IT systems is often captured and
supported in access control models by accommodating the notion of context [Bhatti et al. 2005;
XACML v2.0 2005; XACML v3.0 2013]. These models, however, only focus on context infor-
mation related to the environment. Fong [2011] observes that interpersonal relationships are also
contextual and may only exist in certain contexts. Fong has dealt with this issue by mapping con-
texts to social graphs. Intuitively, a social graph represents the interpersonal relationships that hold
in a given context. On the other hand, Fong et al. [2013] account for the evolution of communities
by extending the language proposed in [Fong 2011] with temporal operators. This extended lan-
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Data Governance Model MO MO MO As MO MO As(SO)∗ As SO As MO MO(SO)∗∗ MO MO MO
Policy Combination MA MA – – – – – Au – Au MA – – MA –
Conflict Resolution Pr CF MP MP Pr MP Pr Pr – Pr CF MP MP Pr MP
Data Governance Model: Policy Combination: Conflict Resolution:
SO: Single-Ownership Au: Authoritative Pr: Predefined
MO: Multi-Ownership MA: Mutual-Agreement MP: Multi-Party Decision
As: Asymmetric CF: Conflict-Free
∗ This work assumes a single owner of data to possess the highest priority in the control of sharing.
∗∗ This work assumes a leader that can set an upper- and a lower-bound of sharing.
Table III: Governance for collaborative systems
guage allows the specification of policies encompassing both relationship-based and history-based
elements, thus accounting for past user interactions in access decision making.
4. GOVERNANCE
Most of the existing access control models are based on the assumption that every resource is ad-
ministered by a single entity, usually called resource owner. Intuitively, the owner of a resource is
the entity that has full control on the resource and defines the access control policy to regulate how
and with whom the resource can be shared. This view, however, has to be revised in order to deal
with collaborative systems and, in particular, with community-centered systems. In such systems,
resources can be simultaneously administered by several entities, each of which might have a differ-
ent degree of “ownership” or stake in the resource protection. Further, resource owners may not be
security experts, or have a complete view of the domain within which the resources are to be shared.
This complex scenario raises a number of new challenges. For instance, each entity should be able
to specify its own authorization requirements autonomously, which should be eventually merged or
replaced by a single access control policy in order to determine to whom a shared resource can be
disclosed (req. R3). This autonomy in policy specification can lead to obvious conflicts, i.e. an en-
tity may want to grant access to a certain user and another entity denies the access to the very same
user. Ideally, an access control system should provide a means to resolve such conflicts (req. R4).
In this section, we review recent developments in the area of policy administration within collabo-
rative systems. By administration, here we refer to models and mechanisms supporting the authoring
and enforcement of policies, based on some underlying administrative protocols. More specifically,
we have identified three main features concerning the collaborative specification and administration
of access control policies: data governance model, which defines the authority that entities have
over a resource; policy composition, which describes how the authorization requirements authored
by multiple entities are combined or reconciled to regulate the access to a resource; conflict reso-
lution, which indicates the method used to resolve policy conflicts in order to obtain a conclusive
decision. A summary of our review is presented in Table III.
Data Governance Model. Within collaborative environments, several entities can be involved in
the creation, management and protection of sensitive resources [Damen and Zannone 2013; Hu
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et al. 2013; Mazurek et al. 2014]. For instance, in social network websites data can be posted by
one user, can be hosted in the profile of some other user, and refer to yet other users. Another
illustrative example is the protection of information derived by the fusion of data collected from
different sources under the control of different entities [den Hartog and Zannone 2016]. In these
scenarios, each entity within the collaboration retains a share of authority on the data. Specifically,
each entity related to a data object can define its own authorization requirements indicating which
users should be able to access the object and which should not [Hu et al. 2013]. The requirements
of every entity should be then combined in order to determine the actual permissions on the object.
To this end, various data governance models have been proposed. Intuitively, the data governance
model specifies the level of authority or stake in a resource that users have.
A recent trend proposes to handle the governance of objects involving multiple stakeholders by
decomposing an object into subparts and assigning each subpart to the corresponding stakeholder.
In this respect, Ra et al. [2013] present the P3 algorithm that allows the selective encryption of a
portion of an image. Ilia et al. [2015] exploit this type of techniques to shift the level of control from
photos to the faces appearing in a photo. In particular, the authors use face recognition techniques
to identify the users appearing in a photo. Each of these users can specify his/her own permission
on the photo, indicating which subjects can see his/her face in the photo. When a subject attempts
to view the photo, a new photo is created based on the permissions specified by each user appearing
in the original photo. The newly created photo only shows the faces that the subject is allowed to
see whereas the other faces in the photo are blurred. These solutions, however, are mainly tailored
to control the sharing of photos/images and might not be suitable for other types of objects and
resources. Moreover, they do not account for users’ interplay to deal with multi-party conflicts,
which is a main desideratum for community-centered environments. Thus, we do not consider
these approaches further in our analysis.
A number of access control models for community-centered systems assume a multi-ownership
data governance model. These models enable the collaborative specification of policies aiming at
the protection of resources co-owned by multiple users [Bahri et al. 2015; Carminati and Ferrari
2011; Ilia et al. 2017; Mehregan and Fong 2016; Rajtmajer et al. 2016; Squicciarini et al. 2010;
Wishart et al. 2010; Xiao and Tan 2012; Vishwamitra et al. 2017]. Data governance models based
on multi-ownership implicitly assume that all entities related to a data object have the same level
of authority over the object. More recently, researchers have acknowledged the possible differences
among various stakeholders involved in the protection of sensitive resources. For instance, Hu and
colleagues identify four main controllers for shared data in a social network environment based
on the relation that users have with a given data object [Hu et al. 2011; Hu et al. 2013]: owner,
contributor, stakeholder and disseminator. The owner is the user hosting the data; the contributor
is the user who published the data; a stakeholder corresponds to a tagged user; and the disseminator
is a user who shares a data object from another user’s profile to its profile. Each of these entities can
have a different level of authority on the resource to be protected.
This has resulted in the definition of asymmetric data governance models in which the degree of
authority an entity has over a resource to be protected depends on its relation with the resource.
In particular, different (types of) controllers may have a different level of influence on the final
decision. For example, Hu et al. [2013] assume that the owner of the data (i.e., the data host) has the
highest priority in the control of the data and is responsible to decide how controllers’ authorization
requirements should be combined. This, however, results in an access control model that is single
owner-centric. Moreover, from a privacy perspective, it may not be desirable to grant full authority to
the data host. According to privacy and data protection regulations, at least for selected applications,
data subjects should be able to influence how their data are processed [Guarda and Zannone 2009;
Xiao and Tan 2012].
A new line of work is now focusing on asymmetric data governance models that go beyond the
notion of ownership. In this respect, Damen et al. [2014] have introduced the notion of archetype
to characterize the relations of a user with a resource. The archetypes for a shared resource are used
to determine the extent of control that users have over the object. Mahmudlu et al. [2016] have
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extended the work in [Damen et al. 2014] by proposing a general data governance framework for
collaborative environments. This governance model relies on an archetype hierarchy to reason on
and prioritize the degree of authority that users have over a shared resource based on their relation
with the given resource. Based on the archetype hierarchy, the framework provide a means to com-
bine the authorization requirements specified by multiple controllers in order to form the access
control policy used to regulate the access to the resource.
Policy Composition. In collaborative systems, each entity related to an object can independently
define authorization requirements specifying who is authorized to access the object. These require-
ments have to be combined in order to build the access control policy defining the permissions on
objects managed by multiple entities. Most of the existing solutions (marked with a dash in Ta-
ble III) evaluate the policies of each entity individually and then apply strategies to combine the
(possibly conflicting) decisions obtained by such evaluations (we will discuss these strategies be-
low). However, this approach limits the strategies that can be applied, and does not allow the use
of combinations of strategies where the decisions of some entities are combined using one strategy,
the decisions of other entities are combined using another strategy and the obtained decisions are
combined using yet another strategy.
To deal with this issue, a few researchers have proposed to combine the authorization require-
ments of each entity into a single (possibly structured) policy. Approaches for policy combination
can be grouped in two main classes. Solutions like the ones in [Damen et al. 2014; Mahmudlu et al.
2016] use an authoritative approach in which the authorization requirements provided by the vari-
ous entities are combined in a predefined manner. These solutions usually adopt or extend languages
that allow the specification of federated access control policies such as OrBAC [Kalam et al. 2003]
and XACML [XACML v2.0 2005; XACML v3.0 2013], to support the collaborative authoring of
access control policies.
Another line of research aims to reconcile the authorization requirements of the entities related
to the object to be protected through a mutual agreement between these entities. Among these so-
lutions, Mazzoleni et al. [2008] propose a policy similarity process and various policy integration
algorithms to combine policies authored by multiple authorities. The policy similarity process aims
to determine which policy is more restrictive. Possible access requests are matched against the
controllers’ policies and the outcome of this analysis drives the selection of the best-fitting policy
integration algorithm for the co-owned resource.
Some researchers advocate the need of interactive negotiation of access control policies to de-
termine how co-owned objects should be protected. Wishart et al. [2010] use weak conditions and
strong conditions to represent the negotiable and non-negotiable constraints of each co-owner re-
spectively. However, the authors do not provide any automatic or semi-automated mechanism to
support the collaborative authoring of privacy policies and, in particular, the negotiation of privacy
restrictions between co-owners. Entities have to reach an agreement through a multi-round negoti-
ation process in which, at each round, entities have to manually review or accept the weak condi-
tions defined by other entities. Mehregan and Fong [2016] propose an interactive policy negotiation
framework to support the authoring of access control policies in collaborative manner based on Re-
BAC. The framework comprises a multi-ownership administrative model in which access control
policies are defined as graph patterns, and an interactive policy negotiation protocol, which allows
co-owners to reach an agreement on the access control policy to be enforced. The protocol sup-
ports co-owners in the iterative revision of the policy of co-owned objects in which co-owners can
express their authorization requirements by counteracting the authorization requirements of other
co-owners. At each iteration, the obtained policy is verified against three availability criteria, namely
satisfiability, feasibility and resilience, thus providing a balance between privacy and sharing. Ilia
et al. [2017] propose a multi-party access control model based on a threshold-based secret sharing
scheme. The basic idea underlying this model is to associate a set of shares to a secret and distribute
these shares among co-owners. Shares can be redistributed by co-owners to trusted users (so called
shareholders) based on selection rules specified in ReBAC. Along with a share, co-owners provide
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shareholders with a share provision rule that defines to whom a delegated shared can be disclosed.
Similarly to selection rules, shared provision rules are specified in ReBAC. In order to access an
object, a requester has to collect from the shareholders a number of shares sufficient to reconstruct
the decryption key (i.e., the secret), where the needed number of shares depends on the sensitivity
of the object.
Although solutions based on mutual agreement between the parties involved can potentially re-
sult in conflict-free policies, this approach requires renegotiating the policy every time a co-owner
changes its authorization requirements. Thus, a large body of research proposes to deal with pol-
icy conflicts when they occur by providing methods for conflict resolution. In the remainder of the
section, we present an overview of these approaches.
Conflict Resolution. Every user demands that his/her authorization requirements are enforced.
However, users can define conflicting requirements for the same resource and, thus, it is not pos-
sible to satisfy all users’ requirements. Most access control mechanisms employ policy conflict
resolution strategies to determine how conflicting requirements should be reconciled. Existing con-
flict resolution strategies can be broadly classified into two main classes: predefined strategies and
multi-party decisions.
Predefined conflict resolution strategies consist of predefined rules that are used to determine
how (possibly conflicting) access decisions should be combined [Shen and Dewan 1992]. These
strategies are usually based on a (partial) ordering of access decisions or on the policy structure.
An overview of the predefined conflict resolution strategies proposed in the literature is given in
Table IV. Typical examples of strategies based on priority between decisions are permit-overrides
and deny-overrides. According to permit-overrides, a policy evaluates Permit if at least one of its
sub-policies evaluates Permit; deny-overrides is the dual of permit-overrides: a policy evaluates
Deny if at least one of its subpolicies evaluates Deny. An example of strategy based on the policy
structure is first-applicable. This strategy requires that subpolicies are evaluated in the order they
are specified and the access decision is the one of the first applicable policy. The first-applicable
strategy is typically used to capture that an entity predominates another entity.
In the literature, we can also find a number of combining algorithms based on consensus and
majority voting. Among the others, we mention the work of Hu et al. [2013] and Ilia et al. [2017]
in which voting schemes are combined with weights to capture the fact that the policies of some
users weighs more than the policies of other users. To deal with policy conflicts, Carminati and
Ferrari [2011] introduce a new type of policies, called collaborative security policies. The goal of
these policies is to involve collaborative users in decision making by gathering feedback from the
collaborative users on whether a certain access should be granted. In particular, these policies spec-
ify how this feedback should be combined: all indicates that access is granted if all collaborative
users agree on releasing the resource (i.e., consensus); one indicates that access is granted if at
least one user agrees on releasing the resource; majority indicates that access is granted if the ma-
jority of collaborative users agree on releasing the resource. These collaborative policies resemble
strong-consensus, permit-overrides and weak-majority strategies respectively. The aforementioned
studies provide strategies to implement a variety of specific and ad-hoc policy integration require-
ments. A few works (e.g., [Bruns and Huth 2011; Rao et al. 2011]) have proposed policy algebras
for the specification of policy combination strategies. It is worth mentioning that these algebras are
able to encode most of the conflict resolution strategies presented in Table IV.
Some recent work has focused on conflict resolution in the context of multi-party decisions. In
particular, researchers have analyzed conflict resolution from a game-theoretic point of view and
proposed negotiation protocols based on game-theoretic concepts such as the Nash equilibrium [Hu
et al. 2014a; Rajtmajer et al. 2016; Squicciarini et al. 2010; Such and Rovatsos 2016; Xiao and
Tan 2012]. For instance, Squicciarini et al. [2010] use the Clarke-Tax model and game theory in
the context of an auction to resolve policy conflicts by selecting the privacy policy that maximizes
social utility. CAPE [Xiao and Tan 2012] addresses the problem of multi-party conflicts by taking
into account the social interactions among the co-owners of the data in conflict resolution. In par-
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Table IV: Overview of existing conflict resolution strategies
ticular, CAPE uses a graph theoretic model to reach consensus between the co-owners of shared
resources by considering the intensity with which the co-owners are willing to share their co-owned
object and the extent to which they want their decisions to be affected by the action of their ac-
quaintances. These proposals, however, are not able to capture users’ behavior accurately [Such
and Criado 2016]. In fact, they assume that users’ behavior is perfectly rational and do not account
for the social facets that are typically considered by users when they have to deal with multi-party
conflicts. Rajtmajer and colleagues have dealt with this issue in a recent effort [Rajtmajer et al.
2016]. The authors followed research suggesting that realistic models of human behavior should
relax perfect-rationality assumptions in favor of bounded rationality models accounting for limited
time and information, as well as cognitive limitations [Kahneman 2003; Simon 1957]. Accordingly,
they propose a bounded rationality model building on the quantal response and recency models [Ra-
jtmajer et al. 2016], which accounts for users’ limitations and yet provides guarantees of success
and well models users’ actions.
Recent work also recognized that users can be influenced by their acquaintances and, thus, can
adjust their decision accordingly [Hu et al. 2011; Such and Criado 2016; Vishwamitra et al. 2017].
For instance, Hu et al. [2011] propose a mechanism for collaborative data management in online
social networks. In particular, authors propose to balance the users’ need of privacy protection and
their desire for information sharing in the detection and resolution of multi-party privacy conflicts.
The detection of multi-party conflicts is based on the segmentation of the space of possible access
requesters with respect to the settings of all controllers of the shared resource. The identified con-
flicts are resolved by finding an optimal balance between the potential privacy threats caused by the
disclosure of the information (the so called privacy risk) and the loss caused by the non-disclosure
of the information (the so called sharing loss). Privacy risk and sharing loss are assessed for each
single controller based on the sensitivity of the shared resource and the strength of the relationship
of the controller with the resource requester. Such and Criado [2016] propose to resolve multi-party
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conflicts based on the willingness of each co-owner to change its privacy settings. Similar to the
notion of privacy risk and sharing loss proposed by Hu and colleagues, a co-owner’s willingness is
estimated based on the sensitivity of the object and the importance of the resource requester for the
co-owner. To alleviate users from the burden of providing such measures, Such and colleagues show
how they can be computed on the basis of the strength of the relationships between the co-owners
and the resource requesters. Co-owners’ concession to relax their privacy constraints is modeled
through predefined fuzzy rules (i.e., “I Do Not Mind”, “I Understand”, “No Concession”) that de-
fine how co-owners would actually negotiate their privacy constraints. During negotiation, if every
co-owner is willing to change its decision, the decision that is preferable by the majority of the
co-owners is selected. Otherwise, if a co-owner has high willingness and another low willingness,
the one with high willingness will concede and the one with low willingness will determine the ac-
cess. If at least two co-owners with low willingness have conflicting policies, access will be denied,
implicitly assuming a deny-overrides strategy.
5. USABILITY & TRANSPARENCY
A cornerstone of community-centered collaborative systems is that multiple users are in charge
of specifying access control policies to be applied to shared resources. Often, these users have
no technical expertise and, therefore, policies readability and usability of the policy specification
mechanisms plays a central role in the effectiveness of these systems [Cao and Iverson 2006]. Easy-
to-use access control systems should reduce the effort spent by users in authoring and configuring
conflict-free access control policies (req. R5). Moreover, user-friendly interfaces should help users
in specifying and configuring policies for shared resources (req. R6). Ideally, such interfaces should
facilitate users’ understanding of the interaction of their policies with the policies specified by other
users and help resolve possible conflicts. Another crucial aspect of access control systems tailored to
community-centered systems is transparency. Transparency pertains to the information available to
users with respect to a (possibly collaborative) access decision (req. R7). In particular, users should
be able to understand the effect of the specified policies and be notified when and why the decision
enforced on shared resources differs from their own.
These requirements are largely understudied compared to other more conventional requirements
presented in Section 2. Nonetheless, as the research community continues to focus on community-
centered access control, we note that usability-related issues are of increasing importance for adop-
tion and wide-spread use of access control mechanisms. To date, the problem of supporting end-
users in policy authoring and configuration is attracting growing attention. Yet, only a few works
that aim to promote transparency in collaborative access control exist thus far. In the reminder of
this section, we review the main research efforts on policy authoring, comprehension and configu-
ration as well as transparency in access control, with a particular emphasis on the ones specific to
community-centered access control. An overview of these contributions is shown in Table V.
Policy Generation. A number of researchers have focused on the automated or semi-automated
generation of meaningful access control policies to assist non-experts users in policy authoring, es-
pecially for image sharing in social networks. Existing approaches vary significantly with respect to
the features used to generate privacy preferences; see Table VI for an overview. Some approaches
derive privacy settings from image metadata (e.g., tags) [Klemperer et al. 2012; Squicciarini et al.
2010], other from personal traits (e.g., location, age) [Squicciarini et al. 2014; Squicciarini et al.
2014] and/or social context (e.g., friend list) [Fang and LeFevre 2010]. Squicciarini et al. [2010]
discuss two alternative approaches to assist users in the automated generation of privacy settings,
thus, freeing them from the burden of specifying a privacy policy for co-owned images. One ap-
proach is based on similarity analysis among pictures based on the tags associated with them: if
two pictures are similar, the same privacy policy will be applied to both. The other approach lever-
ages collaborative filtering: privacy policies are determined based on the ones specified by similar
users on similar images. Fang and LeFevre [2010] propose a social networking privacy wizard to
configure users’ privacy setting automatically. The wizard requires a user to assign a privacy label
ACM Computing Surveys, Vol. 0, No. 0, Article 0, Publication date: 2017.
0:18 F. Paci et al.
Category Approach Source
Policy Generation Similarity Analysis [Squicciarini et al. 2010]
Collaborative Filtering
Rule-based [Klemperer et al. 2012; Squicciarini
et al. 2014; Squicciarini et al. 2014]
Association Rule Mining [Squicciarini et al. 2015]
Machine Learning-based [Fang and LeFevre 2010;
Spyromitros-Xioufis et al. 2016;
Zerr et al. 2012; Squicciarini et al.
2017; Fogues et al. 2017]
Deep Learning-based [Tonge and Caragea 2016; Yu et al.
2017]
Interfaces for Policy Comprehension Circle Pie Chart [Rode et al. 2006]
Expandable Grid [Reeder et al. 2008]
Eyes Metaphor [Schlegel et al. 2011]
Mirror-Looking Metaphor [Anwar and Fong 2012], Facebook,
LinkedIn
Interfaces for Policy Configuration Bubble chart [Mazzia et al. 2012]
Genome bar sequence [Wang et al. 2015]
Circle management [Hu et al. 2012]
Feedback Generation Justification of denied requests to
resource requester
[Bonatti et al. 2001; Kapadia et al.
2004; Ghai et al. 2010]
Notification of policy conflicts to
resource controller(s)
[Damen et al. 2014; Mahmudlu
et al. 2016]
Justification of policy conflicts to
resource controller(s)
[den Hartog and Zannone 2016]
Effect of policy conflicts to re-
source controller(s)
[Hu et al. 2013]
Table V: Mechanisms and interfaces for usability and transparency in access control systems
to selected friends. Machine-learning techniques are then employed to create a model of the user’s
privacy preferences based on these labels, which is then used to configure the privacy settings con-
cerning unlabeled friends automatically. Squicciarini et al. [2014] adopt a rule-based approach to
automatically generate access rules for users’ profile information using multiple dimensions like
users’ privacy preferences, strength of relationship, sensitivity of information and visibility of the
information.
Other approaches (e.g., [Spyromitros-Xioufis et al. 2016]) look at the images themselves to auto-
matically generate privacy settings. In particular, a recent trend leverages deep learning techniques
for image privacy prediction and privacy-aware image classification [Tonge and Caragea 2016; Yu
et al. 2017]. For instance, Yu et al. [2017] use deep multi-task learning to automatically detect
privacy-sensitive objects in images and recommend privacy settings for their protection. A number
of approaches (e.g., [Zerr et al. 2012; Squicciarini et al. 2015; Squicciarini et al. 2017]) leverage
both visual features of images and other information for privacy-aware image classification and the
generation of privacy settings. For instance, Squicciarini et al. [2015] propose an adaptive policy
prediction system based on association rule mining to generate personalized privacy settings based
on social context and personal traits as well as on image content and metadata.
The aforementioned approaches, however, have only been applied to the automated generation
of privacy settings from the perspective of individual users. Recently, some steps towards the gen-
eration of privacy settings for multi-party scenarios have been made by Fogues et al. [2017]. A
main characteristic of this approach is the use of arguments about privacy settings for the genera-
tion of privacy settings besides other factors like social context, the sentiment associated with the
information and the privacy settings themselves.
















































































































































Table VI: Overview of features used for policy generation
Most of these approaches, especially the ones based on machine learning, are only able to deter-
mine whether an image should be treated as a private information based on privacy labels assigned
to similar images. However, this provides a too coarse-grained control for sharing in community-
centered environments. Our analysis revealed that only a few works exploit the privacy preferences
provided by users on previously updated objects. Recent studies have showed that deep learning
provides a promising approach to generate fine-grained policies. However, existing solutions only
consider a limited set of features, typically related to the image content. Other features, for instance
concerning the social context, are needed to capture the complex user interplay in community-
centered environments. In this respect, the arguments about the privacy preferences provided by
users provide a promising feature to assess users’ willingness to change their settings based on the
privacy needs of their peers.
Interactive Interfaces for Policy Comprehension and Configuration. Other research efforts pro-
vide users with tools that support them in comprehending and configuring access control policies
[Rode et al. 2006; Reeder et al. 2008; Schlegel et al. 2011; Anwar and Fong 2012]. The main differ-
ence among these tools is the type of visualization used to represent the policies. Rode et al. [2006]
use circled pie charts (Figure 1a) to represent a shared user workspace where each slice represent
a user, labeled dots represent the shared files and multiple concentric regions represent the permis-
sions applied to each file (e.g., files in the center of the pie are readable, writable and available
persistently). Similarly, Reeder et al. [2008] propose to use an Expandable Grids interface (Fig-
ure 1b) to set file permissions in Windows XP. The interface provides a matrix-based visualization
of a policy, resembling an access matrix. In particular, the trees along the vertical axis represent the
resources, the trees along the horizontal axis denote the principals and the entries at the intersection
of the two trees indicate the access rights that each principal has on the resources. In particular,
each entry is partitioned into five boxes, each of them representing an access right (i.e., read, write,
execute, delete, administrate). Colors are used to indicate whether the access is permitted (green),
denied (red) or some access is allowed (yellow). Schlegel et al. [2011] use the eyes metaphor (Fig-
ure 1c) to let users understand who has access to their personal information: the presence of a pair
of eyes denotes that another user has gained access to the information, whereas the size of those
eyes denotes the number of accesses to the information by that particular user. However, only the
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(a) Circled Pie Chart [Rode et al. 2006] (b) Expandable Grids [Reeder et al. 2008] (c) Eyes Metaphor [Schlegel
et al. 2011]
Fig. 1: Interactive interfaces for Policy Comprehension
category (e.g., colleague, friend) to which the user belongs is revealed, while the identity of the
user is kept private. Anwar and Fong [2012] adopt a mirror-looking metaphor where a profile owner
is given a visual representation of its neighborhood. In particular, it can select a user and examine
its profile from the perspective of the selected user. It is worth noting that solutions based on the
mirror-looking metaphor have also been adopted by popular social network websites like Facebook
and LinkedIn. For example, Facebook provides the “View As” tool that allows a user to see how its
profile appears to the public, friends or a specific social network user.3
Other tools have been proposed to support users in configuring their social network privacy set-
tings like PViz [Mazzia et al. 2012] and VeilMe [Wang et al. 2015]. PViz provides a graphical
interface based on a bubble chart to visualize sharing settings in Facebook and provides support to
generate social groups from public profile information automatically in order to reduce configura-
tion efforts (Figure 2a). VeilMe allows users to explore their personality traits using a genome like
bar sequence where each bar represents a trait and different trait types are denoted with different
colors (Figure 2b). It also supports users in setting their privacy preferences based on their person-
ality traits and uses a social distance visual metaphor to show how much personality traits would be
disclosed with a specific social group, e.g. close colleague, distant colleague or public.
Among the tools above, the Expandable Grid and solutions based on the mirror-looking metaphor
have potential in the context of community-centered collaborative access control systems. The Ex-
pandable Grid could be adapted and extended to give a global view of the policies specified by each
stakeholder on a shared object and the interaction among them. The adoption of the mirror-looking
metaphor can help users understand the effect of the privacy policies specified by other stakeholders
on shared objects.
However, none of these tools has been deployed in the context of community-centered collabora-
tive access control systems. The only notable initiative towards the development of a comprehensive
framework for assisting users in the comprehension and configuration of privacy policies for shared
objects is the SNGuard framework.4 This framework comprises three tools aiming to enhance user
comprehension and assist users in the configuration of their policies, namely MController, Retinue
and Sigma. MController [Hu et al. 2013] is a voting-based tool for the collaborative management of
shared resources (Figure 3a). MController allows the owner of a shared photo to select and configure
the conflict resolution mechanism, possibly accounting for the sharing preferences of the other con-
3https://www.facebook.com/about/basics/what-others-see-about-you/profile/
4http://honeynet.asu.edu/snguard
ACM Computing Surveys, Vol. 0, No. 0, Article 0, Publication date: 2017.
0:21
(a) PViz [Mazzia et al. 2012] (b) VeilMe [Wang et al. 2015]
Fig. 2: Interactive interfaces for Privacy Policy Configuration
(a) MControl (b) Retinue (c) Sigma
Fig. 3: SNGuard Framework for Privacy Policy Comprehension and Configuration (http://honeynet.
asu.edu/snguard)
trollers of the photo. Retinue [Hu et al. 2011] is a risk-based collaborative data sharing mechanism
that allows a systematic detection and resolution of multi-party conflicts in online social networks
(Figure 3b). Retinue allows the controllers of a shared photo to set the sensitivity of the photo and
assess privacy risk and sharing loss based on the defined sensitivity and the preferences given by
other controllers of the photo. Sigma [Hu et al. 2012] is a circle-based approach to enable collab-
orative control of photos based on Google+ circles (Figure 3c). Sigma enables users to group their
friends in circles and to specify the trust level for single friends or for circles.
Feedback Generation. A growing body of research focuses on promoting user awareness by pro-
viding users with feedback about access decision making. Bonatti et al. [2001] propose an access
control system for web services that gives feedback about a policy protecting a resource: when ac-
cess to a resource cannot be granted to a user, further actions, e.g. signing an agreement that would
result in the required access, are communicated to the user. However, they do not consider the prob-
lem of protecting access control policies that, if disclosed during the feedback process, can provide
insights on the policies themselves both to intruders and legitimate users. Intruders can use this in-
formation to find out how and where to direct their attacks; also, legitimate users can deduce what
other users can access, thus violating the privacy of those other users.
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Other works focused on providing feedback to access requesters while limiting the disclosure
of access control policies [Kapadia et al. 2004; Ghai et al. 2010]. Kapadia et al. [2004] propose
KNOW, a system for providing feedback to access requesters when access is denied while limiting
the amount of information revealed about the applied access control policies. This is achieved by
protecting the disclosure of access control policies with meta-policies and providing the requester
possible alternative ways of fulfilling the access control policies that do not violate the meta-policies.
Similarly to Kapadia et al., Ghai et al. [2010] propose a system called Cue to generate feedback
explaining why an access request is denied while protecting the disclosure of access control policies.
However, there are two main differences between these approaches: KNOW generates feedback for
RBAC models, which mainly suggests a user to change role or wait for an event to occur. On the
other hand, Cue is based on an ABAC model and exploits the attributes provided in an access request
to provide feedback on which conditions were not met by the access requester. Another difference
is that Cue provides feedback not only when an access request is denied but also when no policy
applies to the request.
Some steps in the direction of providing feedback on access decision making in collaborative
systems have been done in [Damen et al. 2014; Hu et al. 2013; Mahmudlu et al. 2016; den Hartog
and Zannone 2016]. Hu et al. [2013] provide the controllers of shared objects with feedback infor-
mation to assess the effect of multi-party conflicts and, thus, evaluate the impact of collaborative
authorizations within a social network site. In particular, a controller can visualize which users are
allowed to see a photo but access should be denied and which users are not allowed to see a photo
but access should be granted according to the controller’s privacy settings. Damen et al. [2014] pro-
pose a transparency service for collaborative access control that notifies a user (at policy evaluation
time) when the decision enforced by the system differs from the authorization requirements speci-
fied by the user for the requested shared object. Mahmudlu et al. [2016] extend the work in [Damen
et al. 2014] by showing how XACML-based mechanisms can be augmented with transparency. The
authors investigate two possible deployments of the transparency service within an XACML im-
plementation, namely either as part of the Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) or as part of the Policy
Decision Point (PDP). A recent work [den Hartog and Zannone 2016] makes a step further by pro-
viding an approach for generating justifications of why a controller’s decision was overridden. The
feedback is provided at a level of detail that takes into account the relationship of the controller with
the resource as well as the visibility preferences of the other controllers. This approach is the most
promising to promote transparency in collaborative systems because not only notifies users when
the decision enforced on a shared resource is different from their own, but it also explains why a
certain decision has been taken on the basis of the (visible) policies specified by other users on the
shared resource.
6. EVALUATION METHODS
Evaluation should be an essential component of the design and development of an access control
system. In general, evaluation can be formative, to drive the design process of the access control sys-
tem, e.g. it could be used during pre-design to understand users’ privacy requirements and specify
the access control policy accordingly; or it can be summative to check the access control system’s
effectiveness and correctness or to identify usability problems. The evaluation of access control
systems is usually summative: it is carried out after the design of the access control system has
been completed. The main evaluation methods to evaluate access control systems are listed below:
— Controlled Experiment. This type of study is carried out with representative users in a laboratory
environment where users conduct access control tasks defined by the designers of the experiment.
The main goal of this type of study is to assess the effect of design elements or features of the
proposed access control model or system.
— Usability Study. Similarly to a controlled experiment, this type of study involves observing users
while they are performing specific access control tasks. However, the main difference lies in the
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Evaluation Method Feature studied Source
Controlled Experiment Usefulness, Understanding, [Squicciarini et al. 2010]
Fairness of Collaborative Privacy Settings
Balance between privacy protection and
data sharing
[Hu et al. 2012]
Likability, Simplicity [Hu et al. 2011; Hu et al. 2013]
Control [Hu et al. 2011; Hu et al. 2013;
Vishwamitra et al. 2017]
Adoption Willingness [Vishwamitra et al. 2017]
% of Matched Concession Behavior [Such and Criado 2016]
Peer Pressure Effect, [Rajtmajer et al. 2016]
Consensus-building Approximation
Performance Evaluation Collective Privacy Setting Execution Time [Squicciarini et al. 2010]
Policy Generation Time [Squicciarini et al. 2014]
Policy Integration Time [Mazzoleni et al. 2008]
Policy Evaluation Time [Damen et al. 2014; Hu et al. 2013;
Mahmudlu et al. 2016; Mazzoleni
et al. 2008; Vishwamitra et al.
2017]
Certificate Path Discovery Time, [Carminati et al. 2009]
Assertion Generation Time,
Proof Generation Time
Encryption and Decryption Time, [Ilia et al. 2017]
Secret Share Creation Time,
Secret Reconstruction Time
Policy Satisfiability Execution Time [Mehregan and Fong 2016]
Privacy Risk, Sharing Loss [Hu et al. 2011]
Effectiveness [Hu et al. 2012; Vishwamitra et al.
2017]
Consensus-building Convergence, [Rajtmajer et al. 2016]
Consensus-building Approximation
Amount of Feedback [Damen et al. 2014]
Table VII: Evaluation methods applied to access control systems tailored to community-centered
environments
effect that is assessed: in controlled experiments it can be the cost, effectiveness, correctness of
policies, etc., while in this type of study the focus is placed only on usability.
— Performance Evaluation. It is an automated or computer-generated analysis of an access control
system with respect to load or response times under particular use conditions, e.g. number of
policies, number of users.
Most of the access control systems we have studied have been demonstrated using one or more
usage scenarios (e.g., [Carminati and Ferrari 2011; Ahn et al. 2012]), especially in the social
network setting. Usage cases are, however, hard to generalize and often do not provide insights
on the effectiveness of the approach in realistic settings. Only controlled experiments, usability
studies and performance evaluation can provide such insights. Nonetheless, only a few access
control systems tailored to community-centered environments have been evaluated using controlled
experiments and/or performance evaluation [Hu et al. 2013; Squicciarini et al. 2010; Such and
Criado 2016]; we are not aware of any usability study for these systems. Table VII summarizes how
proposed access control systems tailored to community-centered environments have been evaluated
using controlled experiments and performance evaluation. The analyzed studies are classified based
on two main criteria: feature studied, i.e. the properties of the access control system investigated
in the evaluation (e.g., effectiveness, usefulness), and the evaluation method, i.e. performance
evaluation or controlled experiment.
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Controlled Experiment. To guarantee that a controlled experiment is correctly executed and al-
lows drawing valid conclusions, it is important to follow a formal process. Typically, this process
consists of the following steps as suggested by Wohlin et al. [2000]: scoping, planning, operation,
analysis and interpretation, and presentation and package. During the scoping activity, the goal of
the experiment is defined in terms of object of study (what is studied), the purpose (what is the
intention of the study), which is the quality focus (what is the effect being studied), the perspec-
tive of who and the context (where the study is going to be conducted). The planning phase is the
core step in conducting the experiment. First, the type of participants and the environment where
the experiment is going to be run are determined. Then, the hypothesis of the experiment is stated
formally and the variables to be measured are selected. The experiment design is also selected, e.g.
randomization of subjects. The measurement procedures, the objects and possible guidelines are
defined. The threats to internal, external, construct and conclusion validity of the experiment are
also considered in this phase. Internal validity is related to the reliability of the results; external
validity is related to the ability of generalizing the findings beyond the context of the experiment;
construct validity is related to the generalization of the result to the theory behind the experiment;
conclusion validity is concerned with coming to the correct conclusions about the relations between
the treatment (the object of study) and the outcome of the experiment. The operation phase is where
the experiment is conducted and the data are collected. The analysis and interpretation is where the
data are analyzed to decide whether the hypothesis should be rejected or accepted. The presentation
and package phase concerns the documentation of how the experiment was designed and conducted
along with the presentation of the findings of the experiment.
Most of the controlled experiments reported in Table VII followed only partially the steps of
the above process and therefore their findings may not be valid. They only focused on some of
the activities required by the planning step: the selection of the subjects, environment and objects
and the identification of the variables to be measured. However, no discussion of the experimental
design and of the threat to validity is typically reported. For example, Squicciarini et al. [2010]
conducted a controlled experiment to study users’ understanding of co-ownership, usefulness and
fairness of collaborative privacy settings provided by their approach for collective privacy manage-
ment on shared content. Participants had to watch a video illustrating the concept of co-ownership,
the collective privacy management approach and three scenarios illustrating the features provided
by the approach. Participants were then requested to fill in a questionnaire to measure their level
of understanding of co-ownership, usefulness and fairness. The design of this experiment, however,
has one major threat to internal validity because participants did not have any direct experience with
the approach.
A different experimental design that does not suffer of internal validity has been adopted in [Hu
et al. 2011; Hu et al. 2013; Such and Criado 2016; Rajtmajer et al. 2016; Vishwamitra et al. 2017].
In these experiments, the subjects performed a task using the proposed access control system. For
instance, Hu and colleagues evaluated the likeability, simplicity and control of two of their pro-
totypes, Retinue [Hu et al. 2011] and MController [Hu et al. 2013]. Likeability measures a user’s
satisfaction with the system, simplicity measures the intuitiveness and usefulness of the system, and
control measures the perceived control users have over their data. The participants of the experiment
were asked to complete a set of tasks using the proposed systems, and later complete a post-session
questionnaire on likeability, simplicity and control. Such and Criado [2016] took a more thorough
approach to evaluate the accuracy of their conflict resolution method. Specifically, authors asked
participants to first specify their privacy preferences on shared photos and then automatically gener-
ated preferences conflicting with the ones specified by the users. Based on these conflicts, Such and
Criado asked the participants if they were willing to concede and, thus, change their setting to solve
conflicts with the other people depicted in the photo. Accuracy was measured as the percentage by
which their approach matched participants’ concession behavior. In similar spirit, Rajtmajer et al.
[2016] measured users’ response to peers’ privacy behavior, as compared to their theoretical model.
The experiment was carried out in a controlled setting and based on a simulated network, wherein
participants participate in group social network activities and make privacy setting decisions accord-
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ingly. The above experiments may not suffer of internal validity but they are affected by construct
validity since the hypotheses of the experiment have not been specified.
Performance Evaluation. To date, there does not exist a standard evaluation framework for access
control; every proposal has been evaluated against different criteria and with respect different pa-
rameters, thus making it difficult to compare existing systems. Performance measures range from the
time needed for policy specification/integration and conflict resolution to the success rate in meet-
ing users’ expectations. Mazzoleni et al. [2008] evaluated the time required by their XACML-based
mechanism to integrate access control policies for a varying number of policies to be integrated and
size. More recently, Squicciarini et al. [2010] evaluated the scalability of their collective policy con-
flict resolution mechanism based on auctions with respect to the number of co-owners that appear in
a photo. Similarly, Hu et al. [2013] assessed the performance of MController by varying the number
of controllers of a shared photo. Ilia et al. [2017] assessed the overhead due to the cryptographic
operations introduced in their multi-party access control model by varying the number of shares and
sensitivity of objects.
Damen et al. [2014] evaluated their transparency service by measuring how policy complexity and
social network density impact the amount of feedback sent to users. A similar approach has been
adopted by Mahmudlu et al. [2016] to assess the performance of their transparency service. In this
case, authors assessed the overhead introduced by the transparency service in the policy evaluation
process. Squicciarini et al. [2014] assessed the time needed to semi-automatically generate access
rules varying two parameters: the number of traits in the user profile and the number of friends.
To this end, they have developed a prototype in a content-management system (i.e., Drupal) and
executed it focusing one user’s profile. In a first experiment, they increased the number of the traits in
the user profile according to a uniform distribution over the possible types of traits, e.g. interpersonal
relationships and comments. In a second experiment, they increased the number of user’s friends
while leaving the other traits equal. Other works focused on evaluating performance with respect
to other system parameters. For example, Mehregan and Fong [2016] evaluated the execution time
of their algorithm for verifying policy satisfiability in multi-ownership settings. Hu et al. [Hu et al.
2011; Hu et al. 2012] assessed their strategy for privacy conflict resolution with respect to two
metrics, privacy risk and sharing loss.
Although effective in measuring specific features and algorithms of their own proposals, the per-
formance evaluations lack generalizability. All of them suffer from a threat to external validity be-
cause they are conducted using synthetic ad-hoc generated policies rather than on real-world access
control policies. As a consequence, the set of policies on which they are tested is always different
and this hinders the comparison of the performance of the various solutions.
7. RESEARCH CHALLENGES
In this section, we first give a summary of the literature review with respect to the requirements
presented in Section 2; then, based on this analysis, we identify open challenges for access control
systems tailored to community-centered systems and delineate a roadmap for future work.
7.1. Summary
Table VIII presents a summary of our literature review with respect to the requirements presented in
Section 2 and the evaluation methods discussed in Section 6. In the table, ‘full support’ (4) is used
to indicate that an access control system (or the underlying access control model for requirements
R1 to R4) fully satisfies a given requirement or a comprehensive evaluation has been performed
using a given evaluation method; ‘partial support’ (i) is used to indicate that an access control
system (or the underlying access control model) addresses a given requirement but the requirement
is not fully satisfied by the system or that only certain features of the access control system have
been evaluated using a given evaluation method; ‘minimal support’ (=) is used to indicate that an
access control system (or the underlying access control model) only provides some basic features
to address a given requirement; and ‘no support’ (8) is used to indicate that a requirement is not
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Domain Policy Governance Usability & Evaluation
Specification Transparency Method
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 CE PE
Mazzoleni et al. [2008] Gen 8 i i = i 8 8 8 i
Fong et al. [2009] Gen 4 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
Carminati et al. [2009] Gen 4 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 i
Wishart et al. [2010] Gen 8 8 i = 8 8 8 8 8
Squicciarini et al. [2010] Gen i 8 i = 4 8 8 i i
Hu et al. [2011] SN i 8 i = i 4 i i i
Carminati and Ferrari [2011] Gen 4 8 i = i 8 8 8 8
Fong [2011] SN i i 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
Krishnan et al. [2011] Gen i i 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
Hu et al. [2012] SN i 8 i = i i 8 i i
Xiao and Tan [2012] SN i 8 i = i 8 8 8 8
Bruns et al. [2012] Gen 4 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
Hu et al. [2013] SN i 8 = = i 4 i i i
Fong et al. [2013] Gen i i 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
Damen et al. [2014] Gen 8 8 4 i i 8 = 8 i
Squicciarini et al. [2014] Gen i 8 8 8 i 8 8 8 i
Crampton and Sellwood [2014] Gen i 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
Mahmudlu et al. [2016] Gen 8 i 4 i i 8 = 8 i
Mehregan and Fong [2016] Gen i 8 i = 8 8 8 8 i
Rajtmajer et al. [2016] Gen = 8 = = i 8 8 i i
Such and Criado [2016] SN 8 8 i = i 8 8 i 8
den Hartog and Zannone [2016] Gen 8 i 4 i i 8 i 8 8
Ilia et al. [2017] Gen i 8 i i i 8 8 8 i
Vishwamitra et al. [2017] SN i 8 i i i 8 8 i i
Legend
4: full support i: partial support =: minimal support 8: no support
Gen: General SN: Social Network
Table VIII: Evaluation of existing access control models and systems against requirements high-
lighted in Section 2.2
addressed by the system (or the underlying access control model) or that the system has not been
evaluated using a given evaluation method. In the table, we also indicate whether an access control
system is general (‘Gen’) or is specific for a certain application domain. Here, ‘SN’ is selected
only if the proposed system was casted in social networks and suitable for a few (or even a single)
specific social network. We note that this is particularly the case for access control systems that are
casted on Facebook-like social networks, and build on the specific privacy offerings proposed by
the Facebook platform. We mark an access control system as ‘Gen’ if it can be applied outside the
social network domain, regardless of where its main examples are.
Requirements R1 and R2 concern policy specification and, in particular, the ability of an
access control model to capture users’ interplay and dynamics characterizing community-centered
systems. For the evaluation of requirement R1, we marked ‘full support’ for those models that
allow the specification of (complex) topology-based policies. Access control models that only
consider some aspects of interpersonal relationships like relationship type, depth and strength, are
marked with ‘partial support’ whereas models that only account for the existence of interpersonal
relationships between users are marked with ‘minimal support’. Models that do not consider
interpersonal relationships are marked with ‘no support’. Requirement R2 is considered fully
satisfied (‘full support’) by access control models that are able to capture the dynamics and context
of collaboration and of the environment in which access decisions have to be made. Models
that allow the specification and reasoning over either general context information like XACML
[XACML v2.0 2005; XACML v3.0 2013] (and approaches based on those languages) or the context
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of interpersonal relationships are marked with ‘partial support’. Access control models that do not
consider context information in access decision making are marked with ‘no support’. Looking at
Table VIII we can observe that several efforts have been devoted to accommodate interpersonal
relationships into access decision making and a number of proposals already allow the authoring of
complex topology-based access control policies. On the contrary, very little work has attempted to
account for context information, especially concerning community-centered collaborative systems.
This lack is mainly due to the fact that most proposals only provide a simplified and ad-hoc
language to demonstrate a limited set of features and concepts, which however is often not able to
capture the full complexity and subtleties of community-centered systems.
Requirements R3 and R4 relate to the governance of shared resources. We consider requirement
R3 fully satisfied by access control models that are able to capture the full complexity of the gover-
nance of shared objects, i.e. by approaches that allow accounting for the relation between users and
objects (asymmetric governance models). Access control models based on a multi-ownership gov-
ernance model are marked with ‘partial support’. Models that support features for the governance of
shared resources but ultimately rely on a single-ownership governance model (e.g., [Hu et al. 2013])
are marked with ‘minimal support’. Models based on a purely single-ownership governance model
are marked with ‘no support’. Regarding conflict resolution (R4), it is desirable for an access control
model to provide a flexible and expressive way to reconcile conflicting authorization requirements.
Thus, we mark models that allow the arbitrary combination of predefined and multi-party decision
strategies with ‘full support’. Models that allow the arbitrary combination of strategies but support
only either predefined strategies or strategies based on mutual agreement, are marked with ‘partial
support’. ‘Limited support’ is used to indicate models that allow the use of only one strategy to solve
all possible conflicts arising from stakeholders’ requirements (either predefined or strategies based
on mutual agreement). Models that do not address conflict resolution are marked with ‘no support’.
We note that most of the existing access control models tailored to community-centered environ-
ments are based on a multi-ownership model, and only recently it has been recognized that the level
of authority that users have over a shared resource depends on their relation with the resource. More-
over, our literature review has shown that the problem of policy conflict is largely recognized and
several conflict resolution methods have been proposed over the years. Nonetheless, these methods
are often ad-hoc and based on a single conflict resolution strategy. Only a few proposals attempt
to provide a flexible framework that allows the customization and combination of various policy
conflict resolution strategies.
The last set of requirements (R5, R6 and R7) concerns the usability and the level of transparency
offered by access control systems. Requirement R5 states that access control systems should be un-
obtrusive and should not impose additional overhead on users. In the evaluation of this requirement,
we consider the efforts that users have to spend for conflict resolution as well as the efforts needed
for policy authoring and configuration. Access control systems in which all these aspects have been
addressed are marked with ‘full support’. Access control systems that address only some of them
are marked with ‘partial support’. Requirement R6 is considered fully satisfied by access control
systems that provide interfaces for both policy comprehension and configuration. If only one aspect
is supported, a system is marked with ‘partial support’ and, if no interfaces are provided, the sys-
tem is marked with ‘no support’. To enhance user awareness for conscious decision making (R7),
several types of feedback can be provided to users, for instance to explain the effect of a certain
decision [Hu et al. 2011; Hu et al. 2013] or to justify the decision made [den Hartog and Zannone
2016]. We mark an access control system with ‘full support’ if it provides comprehensive feedback
about decision making. If only some type of feedback is provided, a system is marked with ‘partial
support’. We mark with ‘minimal support’ systems that notify users about policy mismatches (i.e.,
the situation in which the final access decision differ from a user’s preferences [Damen et al. 2014])
and with ‘no support’ if transparency is not addressed by the system. It is worth noting that we did
not identify any access control system that fully meets all usability and transparency requirements.
In particular, none of the reviewed contributions fully supports R7, and only few of them offer even
partial support. We attribute this gap to the level of maturity of the theoretical models and the under-
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lying algorithms and protocols. Clearly, transparency and support are important for fully deployed
access control systems that are implemented in practice. Most of the systems we reviewed aims to
demonstrate foundational and ad-hoc features, and not yet brought to deployment stage.
We conclude our study with some observations concerning the methods used for the evaluation of
existing access control systems. The last two columns of Table VIII show the evaluation method(s)
used for each studied access control system, namely controlled experiments (CE) and performance
evaluation (PE). For both evaluation methods, we mark an access control system with ‘full support’
if a comprehensive evaluation has been performed. We mark a system with ‘partial support’ if only
some aspects have been evaluated and with ‘no support’ if no evaluation has been carried out. First,
we note that empirical studies are scarce (and often ad-hoc) among the systems being studied here,
showing that usability of access control systems (at least for community-centered collaborative
systems) is still understudied. In particular, we observed that the lack of empirical studies is more
prominent for work proposing models for the specification of ReBAC policies (e.g., [Crampton and
Sellwood 2014; Fong et al. 2009; Fong 2011; Fong and Siahaan 2011]). These models are typically
demonstrated through usage scenarios, sometimes coupled with formal proofs of the tractability and
expressiveness of the proposed model (e.g., [Fong and Siahaan 2011]); however, no studies were
carried out to establish the usability of those models. Our study has also revealed that, despite the
number of well-established methodologies for the design and evaluation of experiments available
in the literature (e.g., [Wohlin et al. 2000]), these methodologies have not been properly applied to
the design of controlled experiments and, thus, the obtained findings are not generalizable. Possibly
explaining the limitations of above, we note the lack of available datasets of access control policies
used in real-life community-centered collaborative systems. As a consequence, many researchers
created their own datasets of policies to validate their system. Moreover, most systems have been
evaluated against various criteria. We believe that, without a comprehensive validation, it is not
possible to demonstrate the applicability of research results in real settings, thus hindering their
transition to practice.
7.2. Roadmap
The field of access control has a long history of exciting research findings and development efforts.
Many access control models have been proposed to date, some of which have gained traction in
real-world systems (e.g., RBAC) and others have remained primarily as theoretical models. Whether
access control solutions for community-centered systems can be effectively deployed in real-world
environments is still an open question. Despite a growing interest in access control for those systems,
to this date, only very simple forms of group-based access control have been deployed in existing
community-centered systems like online social networks (e.g., Facebook, LinkedIn). Transition to
practice has been hindered by the lack of maturity of these models. To date, many important issues
must be addressed before this transition can occur successfully. Below we summarize some of the
main open research issues.
— Lack of comprehensive solutions. Our study has revealed two main streams of research on access
control for community-centered environments. On the one side, we identified several relationship-
based access control models that study how to incorporate interpersonal relationships in access
decision making. These approaches, however, often assume that resources are owned by a single
entity and do not account for governance of resources shared between multiple users. On the
other side, we can find studies that investigate the governance of shared resources. These studies,
however, only minimally consider existing relationships among users. Only a very few proposals
(e.g., [Ilia et al. 2017; Mehregan and Fong 2016]) attempt to reconcile these two views, for instance
by studying how interpersonal relationships influence policy composition and conflict resolution.
More efforts are required to reconcile these two streams and design access control models able to
handle the full complexity of community-centered systems.
— Lack of standardized solutions. Many proposals provide ad-hoc languages for the authoring of ac-
cess control policies for collaborative systems. These languages, however, mainly aim to demon-
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strate the suitability of (a limited set of) features/concepts to enable access control in community-
centered systems. Only a few proposals attempt to integrate those concepts into standardized lan-
guages like XACML (e.g., [Mazzoleni et al. 2008; Mahmudlu et al. 2016]). We argue that a suc-
cessful adoption of access control models in real-life community-centered systems can only be
achieved if research efforts are complemented with standardization efforts in order to increase the
level of maturity of existing solutions.
— User-centric. Ultimately, access control systems for community-centered systems should strike a
balance between human-supported work and automation. While users’ involvement is necessary
to specify access control preferences, daunting, multi-round negotiations are likely to fail and
result in low adoption. Moreover, one may argue that lay users often do not have the necessary
information and knowledge-set to assess what best policies and concessions apply for a given
resource. Accordingly, researchers are still trying to identify the best interaction protocol between
the users and the system. This should be efficient and effective: users’ input should be consistent
with their preferences and easy to specify, but most of the remaining effort (policy reconciliation,
conflict resolution and enforcement) should be driven by the system with limited intervention
(ideally no intervention) required from the users.
— Generalizability beyond online social network domain. To this date, most of the work related to
multi-party access control has been designed in the context of web-based social networks. While
this is an important application domain, a generic model should be adaptable to a number of
application domains, outside the “Facebook-like” model. We believe that most of the existing
systems are general and can be potentially applied to other application domains. However, so
far there is little evidence of their generalizability as they are manly demonstrated through
usage scenarios related to social network. Some important challenges arise when one wants to
apply them in a different domain. First, how to specify social graphs underlying multi-party
models? And how could these models be applicable when ad-hoc access control languages are
not available? Most of the work in the field of collaborative access control so far has focused
on discretionary policies, with varying syntax. It is desirable to design access control models
for community-centered systems that offer security guarantees (e.g., safety, non-interference)
provided from earlier access control models. Extending these models would offer guarantees
already provided naturally by traditional access control models, and possibly offer more generic
solutions yet supporting the desired multi-user capabilities.
— Enforcement of multi-party settings. Existing models have put most of their attention to policy
specification and data governance. The enforcement mechanisms have often been assumed easy
to deploy and consistent with conventional access models (a single policy enforcement point
and centralized access database). We argue that as multi-party models adapt to various domains
and infrastructures, related enforcement mechanisms should be revisited and adjusted to support
possible asynchronous multi-user input.
— Interactive User Interface. Most of the proposed systems to date, attempt to assist users in
making possibly complex access control decisions. Yet, usability of these systems is still mostly
unexplored. To date, very few works provide interactive interfaces that facilitate users in setting
their access control policies on shared content and allow users to understand the policies specified
by other stakeholders. We believe that such interfaces are a desirable feature for lay users,
especially in domains that require a thorough understanding of access control policies and their
effect. In particular, their design and development can enhance user awareness of the risks of
data sharing and empower users with the control over their data, thus facilitating the adoption in
practice of collaborative access control systems.
— Transparency. As noted in the previous section, only a very few systems support transparency in
multi-party access control (and in general, in access control for collaborative systems). Existing
systems provide either limited insights into the decisions made [Mahmudlu et al. 2016] or a
partial view of access decision making, e.g. the effect of decisions [Hu et al. 2013] or why a
decision was made [den Hartog and Zannone 2016]. We believe that more research efforts are
needed to provide users with an understanding of access decision making in collaborative systems
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and of the effects of multi-party access decisions. Without this understanding, users may feel
their resources are not properly protected and, thus, be reluctant to contribute to a community.
— Empirical evaluation. Empirical evaluation of access control systems for community-centered
environment and access control systems in general, is often an underestimated aspect of access
control research and development. This is mainly due to the vastness and diversity of evaluation
methodologies, which makes it difficult for researchers and practitioners to find the most
appropriate methods to achieve their evaluation goals. Another aspect is the lack of literature
guidelines on how to evaluate access control systems. Therefore, there is the need of an evaluation
framework that allows researchers to answer several questions: Which qualitative and quantitative
aspects should be assessed? Which evaluation method should applied to assess these aspects?
Which data should be collected? Last but not least, there is the need of available datasets of access
control policies used in real-life community-centered systems, which will serve as a benchmark
for the evaluation and comparison of the proposed access control models and mechanisms.
8. CONCLUSION
This paper provides a thorough analysis of existing access control models and systems tailored
to community-centered collaborative systems. Our goal was to drive research and development of
novel access control solutions suitable for community-centered environments. We found that despite
some growing interest in the area, much work is left to be done.
We identified several important requirements deemed desirable to support access control in these
emerging systems. These span from policy specification (e.g., the ability to capture domain needs
and characteristics and support for contextual policies) to governance (e.g., collaborative adminis-
tration of shared resources). By matching these requirements with the current state-of-the-art, we
found a plethora of models and systems that meet some (but never all) such requirements. In par-
ticular, our analysis of the literature has identified key gaps in existing research in access control
for community-centered systems and helped in the development of a roadmap for future research.
Such gaps are particularly prevalent in the usability realm, as access control systems for community-
centered systems have not yet been widely deployed and tested. We believe this is one of the main
obstacles to the adoption of existing solutions in real-world and commercial community-centered
collaborative systems and platforms.
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